devices

The verification key.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Only devices owned by this user or org handle.

Page size.

Opaque cursor from the previous page's next_cursor.

Page of devices.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Request failed validation.

owner/slug of a robot repo visible to the caller.

Owner handle (user or org). Omit to own it yourself.

At least one in trust mode registered (422 otherwise: a device that accepts no contract can never be handed a policy); may be empty in trust mode approved.

Declare that the adapter implements hold / stop and may consume an endpoint (M15). The driver sets this from the adapter's own code — the chunks protocol plus a passed fail-safe probe (M17d). The hub answers 422 when the declaration contradicts what it can know: the adapter is a built-in without a chunk interface (command, lucen-legged), or it is not a built-in and adapter_info does not declare chunks with a passed probe.

Where the adapter's code came from and which protocols it implements (M17d). Optional; older drivers omit it.

The robot card's interface fingerprint the driver pinned before registering (K1). When given it must equal the card's current one (409 otherwise — the card changed since the driver read it).

Device registered.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

owner/slug of a robot repo visible to the caller.

Owner handle (user or org) of the device-to-be. Omit to own it yourself.

The device's name; else it is named at confirmation.

Pairing started; code is what to type on the robot.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

The pairing code, any case, dash optional. Omit to have the hub issue one for the robot to show.

A suggested name; the pairing's or the confirming person's wins.

Claimed; waiting for a person. code is set when the robot asked for one.

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Request failed validation.

Too many claim attempts from this address; retry after Retry-After.

A pairing id (dpair_...) or, while it is not yet confirmed, its code (XXXX-XXXX).

The pairing.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

A pairing id (dpair_...) or, while it is not yet confirmed, its code (XXXX-XXXX).

Rejected.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

A pairing id (dpair_...) or, while it is not yet confirmed, its code (XXXX-XXXX).

The device's name; else the pairing's, else the robot's suggestion.

Required for a robot-issued pairing (a robot repo visible to you); must match for a person-issued one.

For a robot-issued pairing; omit to own it yourself.

Confirmed; device_id is the new device.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Pairing id (dpair_...), from the claim's answer.

The robot's clock; within five minutes of the hub's.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the key the robot declared, over the canonical JSON of {pairing_id, ts}.

Connected; api_key is shown this once.

Waiting for a person to confirm.

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

The device.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Disconnected.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the device's registered key, over the canonical JSON of {device_id, trust_mode, ts}.

Changed (or already so).

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Page size.

Opaque cursor from the previous page's next_cursor.

Page of requests.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

owner/slug of a model repo visible to the caller.

Which file in the repo. Omit when the repo holds exactly one *.onnx; required (422) when it holds several.

Optional assertion. When given and the repo's current file has a different digest the request is 409 — the caller was looking at other bytes.

How long the policy may run once approved. The window starts at approval, not at pickup.

Why — shown to the human on the pending card.

M15: ask for the device to consume a hub inference endpoint instead of running the policy itself. The endpoint must be visible to the caller and serve model_repo (409 otherwise); the request is pinned to the endpoint's own onnx_path / sha256, the device must be endpoint_capable (422), and the minted token carries endpoint_id inside its signature. The driver then opens a session on the endpoint rather than pulling the model.

K1 — check, do not file: 200 with the request as it would be and its checks[]; nothing is stored or audited.

dry_run: the request as it would be filed, with its checks; nothing stored.

Request recorded, status pending.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Approval request id (dreq_...).

The request.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Approval request id (dreq_...).

Denied.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

owner/slug of a model repo; one you cannot read is an empty page.

Page size.

Opaque cursor from the previous page's next_cursor.

Page of approvals.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

P2 — the approver confirmed, on the page where they approved, that they are at the robot or someone is, with a hardware emergency stop within reach. Recorded in the device.approve audit row as safety_acknowledged and, since K1, signed into the token and shown on the approval. The web app does not let the hold-to-approve start until it is ticked; the API records the answer rather than refusing without it, so the record says which approvals were made without the confirmation.

K1 — the approver read that the policy records no embodiment fingerprint and approved it onto this trust-mode-approved device anyway. Required (422) exactly when the request rests on an unstamped policy whose contract the device never registered; signed into the token, where the driver requires it before it compares the policy's joint order with its pinned interface.

Approved; token is what the driver verifies.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Approval id (appr_...).

The approval, token included.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Approval id (appr_...).

Stopped (issued) or stop requested (running).

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

Page size.

Opaque cursor from the previous page's next_cursor.

Page of events.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Request failed validation.

Device id (dev_...). listApprovals also takes -, every device you can see.

The driver's clock when the event happened; part of the signed payload.

A few scalars (tick, loop_hz, elapsed_s, …) or a reason. ≤ 64 KiB serialised.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the device's registered key, over the canonical JSON of {approval_id, device_id, kind, summary, ts} (sorted keys, no whitespace).

Event recorded.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Authenticated but not allowed (visibility, membership or scope).

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

State conflict (duplicate handle/slug, wrong repo kind, terminal job, ...).

The summary exceeds 64 KiB.

Request failed validation.

Approval request id (dreq_...).

The request, with everything a person needs before deciding.

Missing or invalid credentials.

Resource not found (or hidden from the caller).

Key id carried in every approval token's header.

The iss claim every approval carries.

The aud claim every approval carries.

True when DEVICE_APPROVAL_SIGNING_KEY is unset and the key was generated at process start (dev / CI). Approvals it signed die with the process.

owner/slug of a robot repo visible to the caller.

Owner handle (user or org). Omit to own it yourself.

At least one in trust mode registered (422 otherwise: a device that accepts no contract can never be handed a policy); may be empty in trust mode approved.

Declare that the adapter implements hold / stop and may consume an endpoint (M15). The driver sets this from the adapter's own code — the chunks protocol plus a passed fail-safe probe (M17d). The hub answers 422 when the declaration contradicts what it can know: the adapter is a built-in without a chunk interface (command, lucen-legged), or it is not a built-in and adapter_info does not declare chunks with a passed probe.

Where the adapter's code came from and which protocols it implements (M17d). Optional; older drivers omit it.

The robot card's interface fingerprint the driver pinned before registering (K1). When given it must equal the card's current one (409 otherwise — the card changed since the driver read it).

The robot repo this device embodies; null once that repo is deleted.

The IO-contract fingerprints this device registered; in trust mode registered anything else is refused on the box. May be empty for a trust-mode-approved device (K1).

The robot card's embodiment interface fingerprint this device pinned (K1) — what an approved-mode device compares a policy's embodiment_fingerprint with. Null when the card declared none, or for a device registered before K1.

last_seen_at within DEVICE_ONLINE_SECONDS (60 s) — the overview's rule (K1).

sha256 (hex) of the device's raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key — what lucen-device pair prints on the robot, to compare with the page (K1).

The approval this device reported started and not yet stopped, inside its window, with its time left and latest heartbeat (K1).

The device's own credential when it was paired (K1); null for a device registered with a person's API key.

When the owner disconnected it (K1); nothing is accepted for it after.

Whether this device may consume a hub inference endpoint (M15): true only when its adapter implements the mandatory local fail-safe (hold / stop on a missed chunk deadline or a lost link). A request naming an endpoint_id on a device without it is 422. Since M17d this is the driver's declaration, made from the adapter's code and a probe of its hold() / stop(), not a list of adapter names the hub keeps.

What the driver declared about the adapter at registration (M17d); null for a device registered before it.

When the hub last heard from the driver: its last signed event, or — for a paired device (K1) — its own credential polling, recorded at most every ten seconds, so an idle connected robot reads online.

owner/slug of a robot repo visible to the caller.

Owner handle (user or org) of the device-to-be. Omit to own it yourself.

The device's name; else it is named at confirmation.

person — a code issued on the hub; robot — a code the robot asked for and shows.

The code, XXXX-XXXX — only in the answer that created it (createDevicePairing for a person, claimDevicePairing without a code for a robot).

Null for a robot-issued pairing until a person confirms it.

What the robot declared; null until it claims.

The robot card's interface fingerprint the device will pin (the robot repo's, once known).

The device a person confirmed.

The pairing code, any case, dash optional. Omit to have the hub issue one for the robot to show.

A suggested name; the pairing's or the confirming person's wins.

The device's name; else the pairing's, else the robot's suggestion.

Required for a robot-issued pairing (a robot repo visible to you); must match for a person-issued one.

For a robot-issued pairing; omit to own it yourself.

The robot's clock; within five minutes of the hub's.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the key the robot declared, over the canonical JSON of {pairing_id, ts}.

The device credential (lucen_sk_...), shown this once. The driver keeps it beside its private key (mode 0600); it acts only as this device.

The robot card's embodiment interface, to pin; its fingerprint is device.interface_fingerprint. Null when the card declares none.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the device's registered key, over the canonical JSON of {device_id, trust_mode, ts}.

owner/slug of a model repo visible to the caller.

Which file in the repo. Omit when the repo holds exactly one *.onnx; required (422) when it holds several.

Optional assertion. When given and the repo's current file has a different digest the request is 409 — the caller was looking at other bytes.

How long the policy may run once approved. The window starts at approval, not at pickup.

Why — shown to the human on the pending card.

M15: ask for the device to consume a hub inference endpoint instead of running the policy itself. The endpoint must be visible to the caller and serve model_repo (409 otherwise); the request is pinned to the endpoint's own onnx_path / sha256, the device must be endpoint_capable (422), and the minted token carries endpoint_id inside its signature. The driver then opens a session on the endpoint rather than pulling the model.

K1 — check, do not file: 200 with the request as it would be and its checks[]; nothing is stored or audited.

From the repo's io_contract.json; null when the repo has none.

Which kind of credential asked — an agent's key or a person's session.

The endpoint this request asks the device to consume (M15); null for a run-it-yourself deployment.

UI-API: who asked, and with which credential — a person's session or an API key (its name, prefix and scope) — and plan_id / agent: planner when a plan's planner filed the request acting as that credential.

UI-API — the plan that filed this request, when a planner did.

UI-API — where it would run: the device the request is for. getApprovalRequest and getMyOverview only; null on list pages.

UI-API — what would run: the artifact, its control class and where that class says it may run, and the embodiment the policy was built for. getApprovalRequest and getMyOverview only.

UI-API — the endpoint an endpoint-bound request would consume, when it is visible to the caller (null otherwise; the endpoint.serving check then says so). getApprovalRequest and getMyOverview only.

UI-API — what the hub checked, computed from the hub's current state on every read. getApprovalRequest and getMyOverview only; null on list pages.

C4 — the real-robot trial this request was filed for (its run sheet is locked when the request is approved); null otherwise.

P2 — the approver confirmed, on the page where they approved, that they are at the robot or someone is, with a hardware emergency stop within reach. Recorded in the device.approve audit row as safety_acknowledged and, since K1, signed into the token and shown on the approval. The web app does not let the hold-to-approve start until it is ticked; the API records the answer rather than refusing without it, so the record says which approvals were made without the confirmation.

K1 — the approver read that the policy records no embodiment fingerprint and approved it onto this trust-mode-approved device anyway. Required (422) exactly when the request rests on an unstamped policy whose contract the device never registered; signed into the token, where the driver requires it before it compares the policy's joint order with its pinned interface.

When the policy must be stopped; issued_at + minutes.

The signed EdDSA JWT the driver verifies offline.

Which hub signing key signed it.

Bound inside the token when the approved request named an endpoint (M15).

C4 — the trial this approval runs. When set, the token also binds trial_id and run_sheet_sha256 (the locked run sheet's digest), and the driver refuses a sheet that does not hash to it.

P2's e-stop confirmation, as the approver gave it; signed into the token (K1).

K1 — the approver acknowledged an unstamped policy; signed into the token.

K1 — when a person (or the owner's key) asked a running approval to stop; the driver reads it off its next heartbeat and posts stopped with reason stop_requested.

K1 — seconds left in the window for an issued or running approval; null otherwise.

K1 — the newest heartbeat the driver posted while it runs; null otherwise.

The driver's clock when the event happened; part of the signed payload.

A few scalars (tick, loop_hz, elapsed_s, …) or a reason. ≤ 64 KiB serialised.

base64url Ed25519 signature, by the device's registered key, over the canonical JSON of {approval_id, device_id, kind, summary, ts} (sorted keys, no whitespace).

K1 — on the postDeviceEvent answer only: the approval's stop_requested_at when a person asked it to stop. Null on list pages.

builtin (ships in lucen-device), entry_point (an installed distribution registered it), module (module:Class, named explicitly) or file (path/to/file.py:Class).

The module:Class the identifier resolved to.

The installed distribution that provides the adapter; null for an unpackaged script.

That distribution's version — or sha256:<hex> of the file for a file adapter.

The lucen-device version that inspected it.

Outcome of the driver's registration probe of the local fail-safe (hold() then stop() on a fresh instance, before any hub contact): passed, failed: <why>, or null when the adapter has no chunk interface to probe.

Coarse (about a minute) — answers "is the driver still polling?".

sha256 (hex) of the raw Ed25519 public key; the robot prints the same.

The name the robot suggested.

The person the credential belongs to; null for system.

Set when kind is key.

Set when a plan's planner took the action, acting as the credential above (a plan acts as the credential that created it, narrowed to write).

planner exactly when plan_id is set, agent exactly when agent_session_id is set — the two cases in which the hub itself knows an agent decided. Everything else a key did is reported as the key, whoever held it.

A1 — set when the row was written with a key the hub minted for this agent session, acting as the credential above.

When the plan hands back whatever it is doing.

onnx — one file; checkpoint_dir — policy/ + lucen_manifest.json (M17e).

endpoint (fixed when the endpoint was created), model_meta, or undeclared.

robot — the device pulls the pinned bytes and runs them itself; hub_endpoint — the device consumes action chunks from the hub endpoint over the network, under its own local fail-safe.

The robot the policy was built for (ModelMeta.robot), when visible.

The served artifact's path: the ONNX file, or — when artifact is checkpoint_dir (M17e) — the checkpoint directory (policy). The field keeps M15's name; it is frozen.

The digest every claim, session token and device approval binds to: the ONNX's sha256, or the directory's lucen-checkpoint-v1 digest (see EndpointArtifact).

M17e. The manifest's policy_format for a checkpoint directory (lerobot, lerobot-peft); null for an ONNX.

M17e. What a PEFT adapter sits on (e.g. lerobot/smolvla_base) — the server fetches it from the Hugging Face Hub or its cache; null otherwise.

From the repo's io_contract.json / manifest — for a checkpoint directory, from lucen_manifest.json, which the digest covers; null when the repo carries none.

The tier the model's size selected (the one it is priced on).

The websocket URL the claiming server stated; null until claimed.

The server name given to claimEndpoint.

The server's last claim or report.

Set by stopEndpoint on a running endpoint; the server stops on its next report.

Summed over the endpoint's closed sessions (4 decimal places).

Summed over every session, as the server reported.

Summed over every session, as attributed by the server.

The worst p95 service time (receive → send) over the open sessions; with none open, the latest session that measured one.

The worst p95 round trip the devices reported over the open sessions; with none open, the latest session that reported one.

The Modal function call serving a modal endpoint (W13), set by the dispatch job after the endpoint was recorded. Null for a worker endpoint.

When the hub spawned the modal call (W13); null for worker.

One sentence, safe to show verbatim.

The facts behind the verdict (fingerprints, ids, counts) for a UI or an agent to show.

The key's display prefix (lucen_sk_ + 8 characters), as the key list shows it.

True once the key has been revoked; the row still says it was used.